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Abstract 
 
Standards and compatibility issues play a significant 
role in the software industry.  Often, there are no uniform 
industry wide standards in a standards immature market. 
To overcome the lack of standards, firms in this market 
aim to establish alliances.  In this work, we adopt a new 
research framework called network theory drawn from 
sociology research to represent the complexity of this 
market.  This improves upon traditional microeconomic 
perspectives by addressing indirect relationships and their 
causal effects. We also introduce a concept called socio 
technical capital as substitute measure for a firm’s clout 
or position among other firms.  Using this approach we 
are able relate alliance formation by business application 
software firms and compatibility issues.  The results of an 
ongoing study are presented to substantiate this approach. 
 
Keywords: Standards, network analysis, ERP, 
alliances 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Standards and their adoption by various producers 
determine not only how compatible products and 
components are with each other, but also influence many 
other aspects, including consumer choices.  When a 
uniform standard (for a certain product/component) is 
adopted throughout an industry, consumers benefit by 
potentially having a wide variety of manufacturers to 
choose from.  For example, the adoption of VHS format 
by all VCR manufacturers gives consumers a greater 
variety of VCRs (Grindley, 1995).   Standards potentially 
assume a still greater significance in the software 
industry, in view of a greater number of components that 
perform a multitude of tasks and the need for these 
products to seamlessly function with each other.  Hence, 
software firms face an increasing need to adopt/adapt 
standards so as to ensure smooth inter-operability of 
various components.   
 
Typically microeconomic models have attempted to 
explain the standards adoption behavior of firms.  These 
models have primarily focused on only dyadic 
relationships.  Concepts such as network externalities 
have been used to explain potential benefits that firms 
may derive by joining a network.  We argue that 
relationships between firms in the software industry 
(hence the adoption of standards) are far more complex 
than a simple dyad.  This complexity is only amplified in 
markets that have not adopted uniform industry wide 
standards. Therefore, the questions that we shall address 
henceforth are: what limitations do existing economic 
models face in this context? What framework or 
methodology is appropriate to address the limitation of 
economic models? How can one understand firm behavior 
using the proposed framework? 
 
In Section 2., we classify the software industry along 
the dimension of the degree of maturity of standards. We 
are particularly interested in the behavior of firms in a 
standards “immature” market. The application software 
industry is portrayed as an example of such a standards 
“immature” industry and firm behavior in this 
marketplace is analyzed. The discussion in Section 3 on 
the complexity in this market helps to identify the 
limitations of microeconomic models in addressing firm 
behavior during standards adoption.  The unique 
characteristics of modules that comprise the business 
application software environment are further discussed.  
In section 4.0, we propose a new approach drawn from 
the field of social networks to represent inter-firm 
relationships in this industry. A new construct called 
“socio-technical capital” represents the relative influence 
of a firm in the alliance network.  We then study this 
measure in comparison to a firm’s performance metrics.  
Based on the results we argue that firms strike alliances to 
improve their socio-technical capital and therefore their 
performance.  
 
 
2. Maturity of standards in the software 
industry  
 
Standards are simply a set of rules or protocols that 
act as guidelines. At a higher level of abstraction 
standards is infrastructure, i.e., they "inscribe" behavior in 
complex and non-transparent ways (Hanseth and 
Monteiro, 1997; Monteiro, 2000).  Standards could 
involve rules at various levels, e.g., syntactic, semantic, 
business protocols, communication protocols, etc. In 
effect, a combination of these rules, determine how two 
components interact to effectively support a task (Altman, 
et al., July 1999). One can often observe that in some 
industry structures, these rules are well established. We 
classify such a market as standards mature, e.g., the 
dominant standards created or proposed by Microsoft in 
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desktops operating systems (OS).  Depending on the 
process through which they are established, standards can 
be termed either de facto or de jure (David, 1987; David 
and Greenstein, 1990).  
 
We define a standards immature industry as one 
where there is a lack of uniform set of standards. This 
could be attributed to i. the lack of a dominant leader or a 
regulatory body or ii. in some cases the dynamic or 
evolving nature of the industry (Metcalfe and Miles, 
1994). Note that while there may be de facto or de jure 
standards that might have emerged for specific parts of 
these components, an overall standard for all multi-
component interactions may not be present (Altman, et 
al., July 1999). In the application software industry, 
efficient functioning of application software components 
require standards to be established, both at the technology 
and business protocol levels. While standard setting is 
more difficult at the business protocol level (e.g., 
common process flows, nomenclature, etc.), even at the 
technical protocol level (e.g., database schema, operating 
system), uniformity of standards across components is 
often found lacking. Even though some low-level 
standards (e.g., RPC, DCOM, CORBA, etc.) adoption can 
be observed in this industry, they do not necessarily 
translate to higher-level functional integration (Altman, et 
al., July 1999).  All through this article we will refer to 
this overall integration standards as compatibility. 
 
In a standards immature industry, some firms may 
continue to adopt their own proprietary standards, while 
most others, including new entrants, are likely to partner 
with certain firms and adopt their standard. This adoption 
process appears to be complex in standards immature 
markets. While economic models may be able to predict 
aggregate equilibrium outcome, we believe that it is 
important to observe how the process actually unfolds. 
Economic models are found lacking in this sense 
(Hanseth, 1996). A new framework is necessary in order 
to capture cumulative effects of firm relationships.  
 
We present a stylized view of the application 
software industry as being representative of the 
complexities mentioned above.  
 
3. ERP – An example of a standards immature 
industry 
 
The Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) software 
industry can be broadly categorized into those firms that 
supply certain core components as well as additional ones 
and those that specialize in certain functional areas.  The 
anatomy of an enterprise system (Davenport, 1998) 
consists of components serving distinct functionalities, 
such as, sales and delivery, reporting, financial, 
manufacturing, service, inventory and supply and human 
resource management areas.  Further there are significant 
value-adding, and by no means trivial components that 
are often integrated with the core ones.  Any single 
vendor may offer most of them (e.g., SAP, BAAN, etc.) 
or only a selected few functional areas (e.g., i2’s Supply 
Chain Management (SCM) system, Siebel’s Customer 
Relationship Management (CRM) software, etc.).  In fact 
integration costs incurred during ERP implementations 
account for about 20-35% of the overall implementation 
costs1.  As a result we can find numerous third-party 
consultants (integrators) and converter/adapter software in 
the ERP market. 
 
The ERP industry has emerged in response to the 
business community’s need to integrate its multiple 
workflows.  The history of the ERP industry dates back to 
the days of Material Resource Planning (MRP) software, 
i.e., manufacturing oriented approach was initially 
adopted.  However, with new heterogeneous 
requirements, the vendors often tightly integrated the 
newer components to work best with their existing setup.  
As there were no de facto business model templates, or 
standardized process architectures, these components 
simply took their own course of evolution.  Today there 
are numerous ERP vendors and many more 
complementary software providers who did not 
necessarily adopt a uniform set of specifications for 
interfacing business and technical protocols.  Since 
consumer firms had to anyway invest in consultants for 
their business protocol integration, technical integration 
was not seen as a separate issue but rather simply was 
absorbed into the overall implementation costs.   
 
4. Economic models of standards and 
compatibility 
 
The issue of compatibility ala standards has been 
discussed widely in economics literature (Economides, 
1989; Farrell and Saloner, 1985; Farrell and Saloner, 
1992; Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Matutes and Regibeau, 
1988).  The effects of compatibility on equilibrium 
market structures and social/private incentives for firms, 
to make their products compatible with other products, 
have been modeled in the context of established 
compatibility standards in technology industries (Farrell 
and Saloner, 1985; Katz and Shapiro, 1985). Their 
findings suggest that in the presence of positive network 
externalities, firms have an incentive to achieve complete 
compatibility, i.e., to adhere to a uniform standard.  While 
these models had assumed the existence of standards in an 
industry, subsequent economic models (Economides, 
1989; Farrell and Saloner, 1992; Matutes and Regibeau, 
1988), have addressed the same issues in the absence of 
standards, as well.  Some of these models have further 
analyzed the tradeoff between a firm’s incentives to 
                                                          
1Components in the ERP World, K. Pond, R. Altman, GartnerGroup 
Intraweb,  Research Note Technology, 04 May 1999 
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enable compatibility with rival products and the 
disincentives to create such a standard (Economides, 
1989; Farrell and Saloner, 1985; Matutes and Regibeau, 
1988).   Some of this work (Economides, 1989; Matutes 
and Regibeau, 1988) has also explored the heterogeneity 
of products and their effect on incentives to achieve 
compatibility.  Further, these have also addressed markets 
where there is an absence of any positive network 
externality. However Economides (Economides, 1989) (p. 
1180) also points out that "analysis of compatibility under 
asymmetric strategy and technological conditions is still 
undeveloped" and further he opines that his results are not 
necessarily applicable when “one firm has a technological 
advantage in the production of one of the components or a 
strategic advantage in the game”. In such a case, this work 
observes that although full compatibility between 
components of rival systems is the eventual outcome, 
firms may not have the incentive to decompose their 
products into a system of components.  
 
In all the above models, compatibility has been 
characterized as being either fully compatible or totally 
incompatible.  While this may be applicable in fully 
standardized industries (where a component is either 
integrable or not), a majority of software applications, in 
particular business software such as Enterprise Resource 
Planning (ERP) software environments, one can observe 
varying degrees of compatibility.  As discussed in section 
2., in this article we have characterized these industries as 
standards immature.  Further, in the above models, firms 
have been characterized as being purely competitive and 
even though the firms may produce more than one 
component, these components are considered 
complementary to each other.  In addition, it is also 
assumed that two components identical in functionality 
produced by two different firms are substitutable only 
functionally and not necessarily equally integrable with 
components by other firms. 
 
4.1 Limited applicability of economic models 
for a standards immature industry 
 
Most of the economic models discussed above use 
profitability as the primary criterion by which firms 
decide on compatibility issues.  However, other 
researchers (Hagedoorn and Duysters, August 1999) have 
also pointed out that this decision may not solely rest with 
short-term profitability, but there may other factors in 
dynamic and immature industries.  In such industries a 
firm maybe more interested in capturing a larger user base 
to generate a positive network externality for its current 
and any future products. Most of these models predict that 
firms would make their products compatible with 
everybody (Economides, 1989; Matutes and Regibeau, 
1988). Even assuming that there are no disincentives (in 
terms of strategic alignments), the cost of achieving this 
compatibility in the absence of standards would be 
extremely high. Therefore, the prediction of a firm 
establishing compatibility with all other firms may not 
apply to this industry. In fact the business application 
software industry does not exhibit many of the 
characteristics assumed in the microeconomics models.  
 
The complexity of this industry is not only due to 
great component varieties but also because of the large 
number of firms involved in their production.  While most 
of these firms do not produce the entire systems (i.e., all 
components), many of them do not even produce 
competing components.  In other words it is possible to 
find niche firms who may not have full substitutes in the 
market. Furthermore presence of partial substitutes may 
also introduce certain asymmetries that may affect the 
even the niche player’s compatibility with everyone in the 
industry.  This is in spite of the fact that the niche player 
by itself does not offer any substantial value to a 
consumer, in the absence of certain basic components. 
 
Another dimension of alliance formation is the social 
dimension and the extended relationships that the firms 
have to maintain. As Metcalfe (1994) points out earlier, 
certain learning mechanisms and social relationships are 
constantly created to harness innovations. This dimension 
is not addressed by any of the above economic models 
and even some empirical work on firm alliance behavior 
(Axelrod, et al., 1995; Hagedoorn and Duysters, August 
1999) does not refer to this dimension. In summation, 
relationships in this industry are significantly affected by 
the dynamism.  
 
5. Social network approach 
 
In order to truly represent this standards immature 
market we adopt an approach derived from the sociology 
literature called social network analysis. A social network 
may be simply represented as a set of agents and links 
between them.  Sociology research has commonly utilized 
such representation to study sets of individuals with links 
between them representing specific social ties such as 
interaction ties, friendship ties, marital ties etc. Using 
network analysis it has been possible to examine the 
effect of not only, the direct relationships of an individual 
with other individuals but also the effect of their indirect 
relationships with individuals throughout the social 
network. For example, this theory has been used to 
explain the formation of the Renaissance state in Florence 
in relationship to the rise of certain network of family 
clans (Padgett and Ansell, 1993). 
 
Research in organizational behavior has also adapted 
this approach to study individual networks within 
organizations. For example network theory has been used 
to show that a central contact (regular employee) in a 
hierarchy gets the same information available to a 
manager and therefore cannot be avoided in a manager’s 
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negotiation with other contacts (Burt, 1992). A similar 
approach can also be observed in current literature to 
study industry/market level behavior where the network 
represents organizations and relationships between them. 
Networks have been shown to act as a resource for the 
organizations (Uzzi, 1996; Uzzi, 1997; Walker, et al., 
1997). While each organization strives to maintain a 
viable network of relationships (Kogut, 1991), these 
networks can also capture complexity such as addition of 
new entrants reshaping of existing relationships, etc. 
(Galaskiewicz and Wasserman, 1981; Kogut, 1991; 
Marsden, 1983). Market level networks can be viewed 
using different dimensions of linkages, e.g. patent-citation 
networks in semi-conductor industry (Podolny, et al., 
1996). 
 
Researchers have used network analysis to represent 
competitive positions of firms. It has been demonstrated 
that the structural position of an organization within a 
relevant network of relationships can be significantly 
correlated to its economic performance (Podolny, et al., 
1996). In this network, the structural position of an 
organization can be described by a measure called social 
capital. Social capital refers to an aggregate set of 
resources possessed by actors in a network by virtue of 
their relationships with other actors. It is a valuable 
resource for conduct of social affairs, providing their 
members with “the collectively-owned capital…” 
(Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998).  
 
5.1 Socio-technical capital 
 
While the issue of standards and technology has 
partially been taken into account in some of the early 
microeconomic models, there is a social dimension that 
influences an organization’s product compatibilities and 
hence standards adoption (Actor-network theory 
(Monteiro, 1998; Monteiro, 2000). To capture explicit and 
implicit dimensions of this compatibility, we introduce a 
concept called socio-technical capital. Standards 
literature on technology has exhaustively discussed the 
effect of creating fully compatible components. In this 
section, we will attempt to illustrate some of the 
embedded social linkages that constrain economic choices 
of firms. These embedded linkages represent commitment 
to resources (human and otherwise), presence of 
converters/adapters, evolution of the industry itself, etc.  
 
When a vendor makes it products compatible, it also 
commits to certain resources to also maintain future 
compatibility. These resources maybe result in investment 
in training personnel, sharing knowledge, marketing tie-
ups etc. Networks are also very dynamic and certain 
decisions may be effected by knowledge of potential 
future entrants into the market. Further, compatibility may 
also occur as a result of third party firms (such as 
consultants) who provide adapters and converters that 
could effectively bridge any gap. In this market, these 
converters, known as middleware, may become such an 
acceptable component that effectively the two 
components it bridges may be considered compatible. 
Thus, players other than the two firms involved have 
committed some intangible resources. As Podolny (1996) 
states, “receiving deference eases the problem of 
mobilizing resources to build, to sustain and to expand 
organizations.” 
 
Thus, by representing a network of these business 
application software providers through their alliance 
formation linkages, it is possible to capture all the above 
embedded social and obvious technical compatibility 
decisions.  The measure socio-technical capital can 
therefore be used represent those organizations that enjoy 
a significant clout or position in the market, i.e., a 
measure of its structural position.  Researchers 
(Hagedoorn and Duysters, August 1999; Podolny, et al., 
1996), to compute the structural position of actors in a 
network have used a measure known as the (Bonacich, 
1972).  This can be used to capture the degree to which a 
firm has alliances with other powerful firms in terms of 
their network position. Bonacich Power identifies the 
centrality of each firm as a function of the centrality of 
the firms to which it is connected. A high score for a firm 
is an indicator that the firm is associated with a large 
number of powerful players in terms of their centrality in 
the network.  We have used this measure to represent 
socio technical capital resulting from alliance linkages. 
 
6. Results and Conclusions of a Stage I Study 
 
In order to understand the relationship between 
“socio-technical capital”, a firm’s profitability, the nature 
of alliance formation, etc. we devised a two-stage study.  
The first stage was to identify the formal alliances that 
each ERP and specialist firms entered into with each 
other.  It is interesting to note that many large vendors 
often charged a certain fee for a partner to enter into an 
official and formal alliance.  A formal alliance indicates 
many levels of relationships.  First, it allows a firm to 
advertise its status as a partner; second, this allows 
transfer of technology (prior disclosure of APIs, 
protocols, etc.).  Third, it also allows firms to get access 
to consultants, integrators, trade fairs, etc. which allows 
for the firm to establish indirect social relationships with 
other players in this marketplace. In other words, a formal 
alliance suggests compatibility resulting from a higher 
intensity of knowledge sharing.   
 
For this first stage, we collected this alliance 
information from a sample of 42 business application 
software firms.  At the outset we identified the 10 most 
popular ERP vendors from a third party, non-profit 
information source.  This also ensured that these were the 
most dominant players in the ERP industry and therefore 
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can expect them to occupy a central position in the 
network we would be constructing.  Then we picked a 
random sample of 32 firms from a list of vendors obtained 
from each of the above ERP firm’s list of alliance 
partners.   
 
It was now feasible to construct a social network of 
actors (the firms) where the linkages represented the 
alliances between them.  Figure 1 represents this network.  
As expected the five dominant ERP vendors (in terms of 
revenue and product reach) had the highest socio-
technical capital (Table I).  In other words, the market 
operates more like a natural oligopoly (Katz and Shapiro, 
1985) where certain vendors influence compatibility 
decisions (standards) as though the smaller ones did not 
participate in the market.  This simply implies that these 
firms with the higher socio technical capital 
predominantly control market compatibility issues.   
Furthermore, from our network we were also able to 
observe that all firms did not have an alliance with all the 
ERP vendors (the natural oligopolists) or all the other 
specialized firms.  Thus, this gives a clear indication that 
in this standards immature market where the cost of 
adopting multiple standards are quite high, a firm does not 
approach the market with increasing its profitability 
through the generation of a higher positive externality 
effect. 
 
The preliminary analysis serves to demonstrate the 
validity of the network approach to represent standards 
immature industry.  However, the alliance information 
obtained from the firms is an imperfect (binary) proxy for 
the degree of compatibility. In the next stage of this study, 
we will use some direct measure of the degree of 
compatibility through various levels of technological 
integrability.  The data collection for this study is 
currently in progress in form of interviews and 
questionnaires addressed to actual implementers or 
integrators.  These consultant opinions can be taken to 
serve as true indicators of compatibility.   
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Table I 
 
Rank Vendor Socio-technical 
capital  Rank Vendor 
Socio-
technical  
capital 
 
Rank Vendor 
Socio-
technical  
capital 
1 PeopleSoft 78.54  15 EXE 31.20  29 Trilogy 18.17 
2 SAP 74.59  16 Descartes 31.01  30 Vantive 18.12 
3 Oracle 72.06  17 Commerce 29.89  31 Glovia 17.69 
4 BaaN 68.16  18 Agile 29.13  32 Clarus 17.29 
5 Cognos 66.12  19 SSA 27.94  33 Precision 17.23 
6 JDEdwards 63.00  20 Numetrix 27.47  34 Infinium 15.96 
7 Manugistics 62.58  21 Seagate 26.70  35 Clarify 15.30 
8 i2 58.83  22 Logility 25.52  36 Siebel 13.75 
9 Bottomline 53.57  23 Aspect 23.99  37 Great 13.31 
10 Vastera 52.48  24 Synquest 23.65  38 Symix 12.42 
11 Hyperion 42.76  25 Paragon 22.88  39 QAD 11.14 
12 Extricity 40.59  26 POMS 22.17  40 FRx 9.90 
13 Taxware 39.66  27 Actuate 20.48  41 Mapics 2.82 
14 McHugh 39.58  28 Marcam 19.86  42 Datastream 2.11 
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